[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v2 16/17] xen/riscv: implement mfn_valid() and page reference, ownership handling helpers
On 10.06.2025 15:05, Oleksii Kurochko wrote: > Implement the mfn_valid() macro to verify whether a given MFN is valid by > checking that it falls within the range [start_page, max_page). > These bounds are initialized based on the start and end addresses of RAM. > > As part of this patch, start_page is introduced and initialized with the > PFN of the first RAM page. > > Also, after providing a non-stub implementation of the mfn_valid() macro, > the following compilation errors started to occur: > riscv64-linux-gnu-ld: prelink.o: in function `__next_node': > /build/xen/./include/xen/nodemask.h:202: undefined reference to > `page_is_ram_type' > riscv64-linux-gnu-ld: prelink.o: in function `get_free_buddy': > /build/xen/common/page_alloc.c:881: undefined reference to > `page_is_ram_type' > riscv64-linux-gnu-ld: prelink.o: in function `alloc_heap_pages': > /build/xen/common/page_alloc.c:1043: undefined reference to > `page_get_owner_and_reference' > riscv64-linux-gnu-ld: /build/xen/common/page_alloc.c:1098: undefined > reference to `page_is_ram_type' > riscv64-linux-gnu-ld: prelink.o: in function `ns16550_interrupt': > /build/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c:205: undefined reference to `get_page' > riscv64-linux-gnu-ld: ./.xen-syms.0: hidden symbol > `page_get_owner_and_reference' isn't defined > riscv64-linux-gnu-ld: final link failed: bad value > make[2]: *** [arch/riscv/Makefile:35: xen-syms] Error 1 > To resolve these errors, the following functions have also been introduced, > based on their Arm counterparts: > - page_get_owner_and_reference() and its variant to safely acquire a > reference to a page and retrieve its owner. > - put_page() and put_page_nr() to release page references and free the page > when the count drops to zero. > For put_page_nr(), code related to static memory configuration is wrapped > with CONFIG_STATIC_MEMORY, as this configuration has not yet been moved to > common code. Therefore, PGC_static and free_domstatic_page() are not > introduced for RISC-V. However, since this configuration could be useful > in the future, the relevant code is retained and conditionally compiled. > - A stub for page_is_ram_type() that currently always returns 0 and asserts > unreachable, as RAM type checking is not yet implemented. How does this end up working when common code references the function? > @@ -288,8 +289,12 @@ static inline bool arch_mfns_in_directmap(unsigned long > mfn, unsigned long nr) > #define page_get_owner(p) (p)->v.inuse.domain > #define page_set_owner(p, d) ((p)->v.inuse.domain = (d)) > > -/* TODO: implement */ > -#define mfn_valid(mfn) ({ (void)(mfn); 0; }) > +extern unsigned long start_page; > + > +#define mfn_valid(mfn) ({ \ > + unsigned long mfn__ = mfn_x(mfn); \ > + likely((mfn__ >= start_page) && (mfn__ < max_page)); \ > +}) I don't think you should try to be clever and avoid using __mfn_valid() here, at least not without an easily identifiable TODO. Surely you've seen that both Arm and x86 use it. Also, according to all I know, likely() doesn't work very well when used like this, except for architectures supporting conditionally executed insns (like Arm32 or IA-64, i.e. beyond conditional branches). I.e. if you want to use likely() here, I think you need two of them. > @@ -525,6 +520,8 @@ static void __init setup_directmap_mappings(unsigned long > base_mfn, > #error setup_{directmap,frametable}_mapping() should be implemented for RV_32 > #endif > > +unsigned long __read_mostly start_page; Memory hotplug question again: __read_mostly or __ro_after_init? > @@ -613,3 +612,91 @@ void __iomem *ioremap(paddr_t pa, size_t len) > { > return ioremap_attr(pa, len, PAGE_HYPERVISOR_NOCACHE); > } > + > +int page_is_ram_type(unsigned long mfn, unsigned long mem_type) > +{ > + ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static struct domain *page_get_owner_and_nr_reference(struct page_info *page, > + unsigned long nr) > +{ > + unsigned long x, y = page->count_info; > + struct domain *owner; > + > + /* Restrict nr to avoid "double" overflow */ > + if ( nr >= PGC_count_mask ) > + { > + ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); > + return NULL; > + } I question the validity of this, already in the Arm original: I can't spot how the caller guarantees to stay below that limit. Without such an (attempted) guarantee, ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() is wrong to use. All I can see is process_shm_node() incrementing shmem_extra[].nr_shm_borrowers, without any limit check. > + do { > + x = y; > + /* > + * Count == 0: Page is not allocated, so we cannot take a reference. > + * Count == -1: Reference count would wrap, which is invalid. > + */ May I once again ask that you look carefully at comments (as much as at code) you copy. Clearly this comment wasn't properly updated when the bumping by 1 was changed to bumping by nr. > + if ( unlikely(((x + nr) & PGC_count_mask) <= nr) ) > + return NULL; > + } > + while ( (y = cmpxchg(&page->count_info, x, x + nr)) != x ); > + > + owner = page_get_owner(page); > + ASSERT(owner); > + > + return owner; > +} > + > +struct domain *page_get_owner_and_reference(struct page_info *page) > +{ > + return page_get_owner_and_nr_reference(page, 1); > +} > + > +void put_page_nr(struct page_info *page, unsigned long nr) > +{ > + unsigned long nx, x, y = page->count_info; > + > + do { > + ASSERT((y & PGC_count_mask) >= nr); > + x = y; > + nx = x - nr; > + } > + while ( unlikely((y = cmpxchg(&page->count_info, x, nx)) != x) ); > + > + if ( unlikely((nx & PGC_count_mask) == 0) ) > + { > +#ifdef CONFIG_STATIC_MEMORY > + if ( unlikely(nx & PGC_static) ) > + free_domstatic_page(page); > + else > +#endif Such #ifdef-ed-out code is liable to go stale. Minimally use IS_ENABLED(). Even better would imo be if you introduced a "stub" PGC_static, resolving to 0 (i.e. for now unconditionally). Jan
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