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[Xen-users] Xen Security Advisory 101 - information leak via gnttab_setup_table on ARM



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                    Xen Security Advisory XSA-101
                            version 2

            information leak via gnttab_setup_table on ARM

UPDATES IN VERSION 2
====================

Public release.

ISSUE DESCRIPTION
=================

When initialising an internal data structure on ARM platform Xen was
not correctly initialising the memory containing the list of a
domain's grant table pages. This list is returned by the
GNTTABOP_setup_table subhypercall, leading to an information leak.

IMPACT
======

Malicious guest administrators can obtain some of the memory contents
of other domains:

Up to 8*max_nr_grant_frames bytes of uninitialised memory can be
leaked to the calling domain. This memory may have been previously
used by either the hypervisor or other guests.

The default max_nr_grant_frames is 32, hence by default 256 bytes may
be leaked in this way.  However this can be overridden via the
"gnttab_max_nr_frames" hypervisor command line option.

VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
==================

Both 32- and 64-bit ARM systems are vulnerable from Xen 4.4 onward.

MITIGATION
==========

None.

CREDITS
=======

This issue was discovered by Julien Grall.

RESOLUTION
==========

Applying the attached patch resolves this issue.

xsa101.patch        xen-unstable, Xen 4.4.x

$ sha256sum xsa101*.patch
12ea475265a0804a3a42f620d7065a7408a5ae4b017c871847424c7247c204e9  xsa101.patch
$
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Attachment: xsa101.patch
Description: Binary data

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