Xen project Mailing List

[Xen-users] Xen Security Advisory 266 (CVE-2018-12892) - libxl fails to honour readonly flag on HVM emulated SCSI disks

To: xen-announce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, xen-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, oss-security@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

From: Xen.org security team <security@xxxxxxx>

Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2018 21:04:03 +0000

Cc: "Xen.org security team" <security-team-members@xxxxxxx>

Delivery-date: Wed, 27 Jun 2018 21:05:07 +0000

List-id: Xen user discussion <xen-users.lists.xenproject.org>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2018-12892 / XSA-266 version 3 libxl fails to honour readonly flag on HVM emulated SCSI disks UPDATES IN VERSION 3 ==================== Public release. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= libxl fails to pass the readonly flag to qemu when setting up a SCSI disk, due to what was probably an erroneous merge conflict resolution. IMPACT ====== Malicious guest administrators or (in some situations) users may be able to write to supposedly read-only disk images. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== Only emulated SCSI disks (specified as "sd" in the libxl disk configuration, or an equivalent) are affected. IDE disks ("hd") are not affected (because attempts to make them readonly are rejected). Additionally, CDROM devices (that is, devices specified to be presented to the guest as CDROMs, regardless of the nature of the backing storage on the host) are not affected; they are always readonly. Only systems using qemu-xen (rather than qemu-xen-traditional) as the device model version are vulnerable. Only systems using libxl or libxl-based toolstacks are vulnerable. (This includes xl, and libvirt with the libxl driver.) The vulnerability is present in Xen versions 4.7 and later. (In earlier versions, provided that the patch for XSA-142 has been applied, attempts to create readonly disks are rejected.) If the host and guest together usually support PVHVM, the issue is exploitable only if the malicious guest administrator has control of the guest kernel or guest kernel command line. MITIGATION ========== Switching to qemu-xen-traditional will avoid this vulnerability. This can be done with device_model_version="qemu-xen-traditional" in the xl configuration file. Using stub domain device models (which necessarily involves switching to qemu-xen-traditional) will also avoid this vulnerability. This can be done with device_model_stubdomain_override=true in the xl configuration file. All of these mitigations are liable to have other guest-visible effects or even regressions. It may be possible, depending on the configuration, to make the underlying storage object readonly, or to make it reject writes. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Andrew Reimers of OrionVM. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue. xsa266/*.patch xen-unstable xsa266-4.10/*.patch Xen 4.10.x xsa266-4.9/*.patch Xen 4.9.x xsa266-4.8/*.patch Xen 4.8.x xsa266-4.7/*.patch Xen 4.7.x xsa266-4.6/*.patch Xen 4.6.x $ sha256sum xsa266* xsa266*/* d0d998bb3c2f36b0795cdf86d52aa2da3eee72218f9073f398fc6fd2cf5719cd xsa266.meta 0e5634c9b730e2e022bfef9ded2bb81b7740d05911dae6499671db5cb90663c0 xsa266-4.7/0001-libxl-qemu_disk_scsi_drive_string-Break-out-common-p.patch e6dcef1bdd890a245cb9181266fc1378d77b08cf06c063f35a0835ab3b99cf91 xsa266-4.7/0002-libxl-restore-passing-readonly-to-qemu-for-SCSI-disk.patch 19ce6f236702219eb4831ed597f82dc81122fd517131e826643cee95b53d9f1c xsa266-4.8/0001-libxl-qemu_disk_scsi_drive_string-Break-out-common-p.patch e0a4c616218bc42abada75aa5fa0c3e35da6b6334fe50d6104a5892ffebcdb04 xsa266-4.8/0002-libxl-restore-passing-readonly-to-qemu-for-SCSI-disk.patch 9fd48f20da140731bb71dde07035b938cf0966339449a0b6833787767c588c0a xsa266-4.9/0001-libxl-qemu_disk_scsi_drive_string-Break-out-common-p.patch f23d0e76f15b1f6af487adc36a84cf2591197548ca7cab8ee84be72a87424cf7 xsa266-4.9/0002-libxl-restore-passing-readonly-to-qemu-for-SCSI-disk.patch 3d857f38d11b5531a651a45c2f151ac1493260524d4f49ead6833b5f1d599e64 xsa266-4.10/0001-libxl-qemu_disk_scsi_drive_string-Break-out-common-p.patch e380976abd77b5b46d69c9564aca3acf9bf467b36645ac34e035aba89d081591 xsa266-4.10/0002-libxl-restore-passing-readonly-to-qemu-for-SCSI-disk.patch 160dc8c8a918cae7259c252af098206f9eff357e52bdfc0b15553e9c31c587e6 xsa266/0001-libxl-qemu_disk_scsi_drive_string-Break-out-common-p.patch 2b44fd6baac094c82145667a16d9b1530b97fa342d0e635c831425b53a336266 xsa266/0002-libxl-restore-passing-readonly-to-qemu-for-SCSI-disk.patch $ DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of patches or mitigations is NOT permitted (except where all the affected systems and VMs are administered and used only by organisations which are members of the Xen Project Security Issues Predisclosure List). Specifically, deployment on public cloud systems is NOT permitted. This is because all of the patches and mitigations make significant guest-visible changes. In particular, applying the patch will cause the emulated SCSI disk object to be reported to the guest as readonly, when previously it was reported as writeable. Deployment is permitted only AFTER the embargo ends. (Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.) For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information, consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy: http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJbM+5LAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZ60YH/i11vnbKl2aKf8e+xchv3Ouf 9egSbsy9T8DfvQLZuXQJ4pXoIR8aRrpbZBK5G6HrK3N+eyVnOoRGR+c5nR4k6QFi kG+huw1xogN1TJyf1ln1zpy4sTJt7jmw5ZQEVqoHgsiwgifJiLKVMClQAsvNRkgq su+k4zii863l+2KJdrnsQUlSiO0rHxIgJOs6txSNKHuyJmasHata7O20fcbZ2eNY g+SMK3QinOTSGTK8gDJQcsBGm3XdmC3OOoXt3DjLvl2/NwAB51oSFr+wdDHl0k8s jVzRvBwauOelMyteH80lENJLVej52NVMhWDufWu7iGhoh9fZvD3xubO9zFeCtOY= =UpOb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Attachment: xsa266.meta
Description: Binary data

_______________________________________________ Xen-users mailing list Xen-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-users

©2013 Xen Project, A Linux Foundation Collaborative Project. All Rights Reserved.
Linux Foundation is a registered trademark of The Linux Foundation.
Xen Project is a trademark of The Linux Foundation.