Re: [Xen-devel] stubdom questions

[Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Jan Beulich writes ("Re: [Xen-devel] stubdom questions"):
> On 09.11.10 at 18:00, Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > Yes, this is intentional.  We don't want to update these unless
> > necessary, really.
> 
> So even security problems fixed in upstream packages are deemed
> to be of no concern (or if they are, need to be handled manually by
> adding patches)?

The libraries underlying stubdom aren't exposed directly to hostile
data; they communicate only with the qemu in stubdom, and dom0.
Communication with the untrusted guest is done by the qemu code.
Furthermore, the stubdom itself is supposed to be no more trusted than
the guest it is servicing.  So I think in theory almost all security
bugs in these libraries should be unexploitable in the stubdom
context.

If you could point to a counterexample that would be very interesting.

> > The stubdom build system is a bit of a mess, unfortunately.
> 
> Are there intentions to get this cleaned up?

In the long term yes, but I don't think we have it as a priority.

Ian.

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