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[Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC 1/4] x86/SVM: support data breakpoint extension registers



Leveraging the generic MSR save/restore logic introduced a little while
ago.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

--- a/tools/libxc/xc_cpufeature.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_cpufeature.h
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_NODEID_MSR  19 /* NodeId MSR */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TBM         21 /* trailing bit manipulations */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT     22 /* topology extensions CPUID leafs */
+#define X86_FEATURE_DBEXT       26 /* data breakpoint extension */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ebx) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE     0 /* {RD,WR}{FS,GS}BASE instructions */
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
@@ -110,9 +110,10 @@ static void amd_xc_cpuid_policy(
                     bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH) |
                     bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_OSVW) |
                     bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_XOP) |
+                    bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_LWP) |
                     bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_FMA4) |
                     bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_TBM) |
-                    bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_LWP));
+                    bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_DBEXT));
         regs[3] &= (0x0183f3ff | /* features shared with 0x00000001:EDX */
                     (is_pae ? bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_NX) : 0) |
                     (is_64bit ? bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_LM) : 0) |
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -3082,6 +3082,9 @@ void hvm_cpuid(unsigned int input, unsig
         /* Only provide PSE36 when guest runs in 32bit PAE or in long mode */
         if ( !(hvm_pae_enabled(v) || hvm_long_mode_enabled(v)) )
             *edx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PSE36);
+        /* Hide data breakpoint extensions if the hardware has not support. */
+        if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DBEXT) )
+            *ecx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_DBEXT);
         break;
     }
 }
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -160,14 +160,28 @@ void svm_intercept_msr(struct vcpu *v, u
 static void svm_save_dr(struct vcpu *v)
 {
     struct vmcb_struct *vmcb = v->arch.hvm_svm.vmcb;
+    unsigned int flag_dr_dirty = v->arch.hvm_vcpu.flag_dr_dirty;
 
-    if ( !v->arch.hvm_vcpu.flag_dr_dirty )
+    if ( !flag_dr_dirty )
         return;
 
     /* Clear the DR dirty flag and re-enable intercepts for DR accesses. */
     v->arch.hvm_vcpu.flag_dr_dirty = 0;
     vmcb_set_dr_intercepts(vmcb, ~0u);
 
+    if ( flag_dr_dirty & 2 )
+    {
+        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_RW);
+        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_RW);
+        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR2_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_RW);
+        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR3_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_RW);
+
+        rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK, v->arch.hvm_svm.dr_mask[0]);
+        rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK, v->arch.hvm_svm.dr_mask[1]);
+        rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DR2_ADDRESS_MASK, v->arch.hvm_svm.dr_mask[2]);
+        rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DR3_ADDRESS_MASK, v->arch.hvm_svm.dr_mask[3]);
+    }
+
     v->arch.debugreg[0] = read_debugreg(0);
     v->arch.debugreg[1] = read_debugreg(1);
     v->arch.debugreg[2] = read_debugreg(2);
@@ -178,12 +192,32 @@ static void svm_save_dr(struct vcpu *v)
 
 static void __restore_debug_registers(struct vmcb_struct *vmcb, struct vcpu *v)
 {
+    unsigned int ecx;
+
     if ( v->arch.hvm_vcpu.flag_dr_dirty )
         return;
 
     v->arch.hvm_vcpu.flag_dr_dirty = 1;
     vmcb_set_dr_intercepts(vmcb, 0);
 
+    ASSERT(v == current);
+    hvm_cpuid(0x80000001, NULL, NULL, &ecx, NULL);
+    if ( test_bit(X86_FEATURE_DBEXT & 31, &ecx) )
+    {
+        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE);
+        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE);
+        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR2_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE);
+        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR3_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE);
+
+        wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK, v->arch.hvm_svm.dr_mask[0]);
+        wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK, v->arch.hvm_svm.dr_mask[1]);
+        wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DR2_ADDRESS_MASK, v->arch.hvm_svm.dr_mask[2]);
+        wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DR3_ADDRESS_MASK, v->arch.hvm_svm.dr_mask[3]);
+
+        /* Can't use hvm_cpuid() in svm_save_dr(): v != current. */
+        v->arch.hvm_vcpu.flag_dr_dirty |= 2;
+    }
+
     write_debugreg(0, v->arch.debugreg[0]);
     write_debugreg(1, v->arch.debugreg[1]);
     write_debugreg(2, v->arch.debugreg[2]);
@@ -355,6 +389,72 @@ static int svm_load_vmcb_ctxt(struct vcp
     return 0;
 }
 
+static unsigned int __init svm_init_msr(void)
+{
+    return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DBEXT) ? 4 : 0;
+}
+
+static void svm_save_msr(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_msr *ctxt)
+{
+    if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DBEXT) )
+    {
+        ctxt->msr[ctxt->count].val = v->arch.hvm_svm.dr_mask[0];
+        if ( ctxt->msr[ctxt->count].val )
+            ctxt->msr[ctxt->count++].index = MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK;
+
+        ctxt->msr[ctxt->count].val = v->arch.hvm_svm.dr_mask[1];
+        if ( ctxt->msr[ctxt->count].val )
+            ctxt->msr[ctxt->count++].index = MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK;
+
+        ctxt->msr[ctxt->count].val = v->arch.hvm_svm.dr_mask[2];
+        if ( ctxt->msr[ctxt->count].val )
+            ctxt->msr[ctxt->count++].index = MSR_AMD64_DR2_ADDRESS_MASK;
+
+        ctxt->msr[ctxt->count].val = v->arch.hvm_svm.dr_mask[3];
+        if ( ctxt->msr[ctxt->count].val )
+            ctxt->msr[ctxt->count++].index = MSR_AMD64_DR3_ADDRESS_MASK;
+    }
+}
+
+static int svm_load_msr(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_msr *ctxt)
+{
+    unsigned int i, idx;
+    int err = 0;
+
+    for ( i = 0; i < ctxt->count; ++i )
+    {
+        switch ( idx = ctxt->msr[i].index )
+        {
+        case MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK:
+            if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DBEXT) )
+                err = -ENXIO;
+            else if ( ctxt->msr[i].val >> 32 )
+                err = -EDOM;
+            else
+                v->arch.hvm_svm.dr_mask[0] = ctxt->msr[i].val;
+            break;
+
+        case MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK ... MSR_AMD64_DR3_ADDRESS_MASK:
+            if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DBEXT) )
+                err = -ENXIO;
+            else if ( ctxt->msr[i].val >> 32 )
+                err = -EDOM;
+            else
+                v->arch.hvm_svm.dr_mask[idx - MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK + 1] =
+                    ctxt->msr[i].val;
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            continue;
+        }
+        if ( err )
+            break;
+        ctxt->msr[i]._rsvd = 1;
+    }
+
+    return err;
+}
+
 static void svm_fpu_enter(struct vcpu *v)
 {
     struct vmcb_struct *n1vmcb = vcpu_nestedhvm(v).nv_n1vmcx;
@@ -1451,6 +1551,8 @@ static int svm_msr_read_intercept(unsign
 
     switch ( msr )
     {
+        unsigned int ecx;
+
     case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
         *msr_content = v->arch.hvm_svm.guest_sysenter_cs;
         break;
@@ -1526,6 +1628,21 @@ static int svm_msr_read_intercept(unsign
         vpmu_do_rdmsr(msr, msr_content);
         break;
 
+    case MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK:
+        hvm_cpuid(0x80000001, NULL, NULL, &ecx, NULL);
+        if ( !test_bit(X86_FEATURE_DBEXT & 31, &ecx) )
+            goto gpf;
+        *msr_content = v->arch.hvm_svm.dr_mask[0];
+        break;
+
+    case MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK ... MSR_AMD64_DR3_ADDRESS_MASK:
+        hvm_cpuid(0x80000001, NULL, NULL, &ecx, NULL);
+        if ( !test_bit(X86_FEATURE_DBEXT & 31, &ecx) )
+            goto gpf;
+        *msr_content =
+            v->arch.hvm_svm.dr_mask[msr - MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK + 1];
+        break;
+
     case MSR_AMD_OSVW_ID_LENGTH:
     case MSR_AMD_OSVW_STATUS:
         ret = svm_handle_osvw(v, msr, msr_content, 1);
@@ -1594,6 +1711,8 @@ static int svm_msr_write_intercept(unsig
 
     switch ( msr )
     {
+        unsigned int ecx;
+
     case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
         vmcb->sysenter_cs = v->arch.hvm_svm.guest_sysenter_cs = msr_content;
         break;
@@ -1669,6 +1788,21 @@ static int svm_msr_write_intercept(unsig
          */
         break;
 
+    case MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK:
+        hvm_cpuid(0x80000001, NULL, NULL, &ecx, NULL);
+        if ( !test_bit(X86_FEATURE_DBEXT & 31, &ecx) || (msr_content >> 32) )
+            goto gpf;
+        v->arch.hvm_svm.dr_mask[0] = msr_content;
+        break;
+
+    case MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK ... MSR_AMD64_DR3_ADDRESS_MASK:
+        hvm_cpuid(0x80000001, NULL, NULL, &ecx, NULL);
+        if ( !test_bit(X86_FEATURE_DBEXT & 31, &ecx) || (msr_content >> 32) )
+            goto gpf;
+        v->arch.hvm_svm.dr_mask[msr - MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK + 1] =
+            msr_content;
+        break;
+
     case MSR_AMD_OSVW_ID_LENGTH:
     case MSR_AMD_OSVW_STATUS:
         ret = svm_handle_osvw(v, msr, &msr_content, 0);
@@ -2022,6 +2156,9 @@ static struct hvm_function_table __initd
     .vcpu_destroy         = svm_vcpu_destroy,
     .save_cpu_ctxt        = svm_save_vmcb_ctxt,
     .load_cpu_ctxt        = svm_load_vmcb_ctxt,
+    .init_msr             = svm_init_msr,
+    .save_msr             = svm_save_msr,
+    .load_msr             = svm_load_msr,
     .get_interrupt_shadow = svm_get_interrupt_shadow,
     .set_interrupt_shadow = svm_set_interrupt_shadow,
     .guest_x86_mode       = svm_guest_x86_mode,
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_NODEID_MSR  (6*32+19) /* NodeId MSR */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TBM         (6*32+21) /* trailing bit manipulations */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT     (6*32+22) /* topology extensions CPUID leafs */
+#define X86_FEATURE_DBEXT       (6*32+26) /* data breakpoint extension */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ebx), word 7 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE   (7*32+ 0) /* {RD,WR}{FS,GS}BASE instructions */
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.h
@@ -515,6 +515,9 @@ struct arch_svm_struct {
     uint64_t guest_lwp_cfg;      /* guest version */
     uint64_t cpu_lwp_cfg;        /* CPU version */
 
+    /* data breakpoint extension MSRs */
+    uint32_t dr_mask[4];
+
     /* OSVW MSRs */
     struct {
         u64 length;
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ struct hvm_vcpu {
 
     int                 xen_port;
 
-    bool_t              flag_dr_dirty;
+    u8                  flag_dr_dirty;
     bool_t              debug_state_latch;
     bool_t              single_step;
 
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
@@ -206,6 +206,11 @@
 #define MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG               0xc0011022
 #define AMD64_NB_CFG_CF8_EXT_ENABLE_BIT        46
 
+#define MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK     0xc0011027
+#define MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK     0xc0011019
+#define MSR_AMD64_DR2_ADDRESS_MASK     0xc001101a
+#define MSR_AMD64_DR3_ADDRESS_MASK     0xc001101b
+
 /* AMD Family10h machine check MSRs */
 #define MSR_F10_MC4_MISC1              0xc0000408
 #define MSR_F10_MC4_MISC2              0xc0000409


Attachment: SVM-debug-address-mask-MSRs.patch
Description: Text document

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