[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v7 10/10] xen/common: do not implicitly permit access to mapped I/O memory
>>> On 26.05.14 at 11:03, <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> On 25.05.14 at 19:14, <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> On 06/05/14 10:06, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> @@ -838,7 +842,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) > u_domctl) >>>> break; >>>> >>>> ret = -EPERM; >>>> - if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) ) >>>> + if ( !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end) ) >>> >>> I'm not sure if we shouldn't rather be conservative here and check >>> both domains' permissions. >> >> I think we only need to check the permission of the current domain. >> Checking the permission of the guest is not necessary here. Hence, the >> code to map a region will be more difficult. We will have first call >> iomem_permission then call memory_mapping. >> >> I would prefer to keep the current permission check ie: >> >> if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, ...) ) > > In fact my earlier comment was wrong - for some reason I was > thinking this was the mapping operation that gets modified here, > not the permission one. For the permission one it is of course > wrong to check the subject domain's permissions, as they're only > about to be granted. Or maybe I wasn't wrong - the patch context doesn't really make clear whether it's the granting or mapping operation that gets adjusted here (since an earlier patch moved the mapping one into this function). Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |