Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] Sanity check xsave area when migrating or restoring from older Xen verions

[Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On 17/10/2014 18:11, Don Koch wrote:
> Xen 4.3 and older transferred a maximum sized xsave area (as if all
> the available XCR0 bits were set); the new version only transfers
> based on the actual XCR0 bits. This may result in a smaller area if
> the last sections were missing (e.g., the LWP area from an AMD
> machine). If the size doesn't match the XCR0 derived size, the size is
> checked against the maximum size and the part of the xsave area
> between the actual and maximum used size is checked for zero data. If
> either the max size check or any part of the overflow area is
> non-zero, we return with an error.
>
> Signed-off-by: Don Koch <dkoch@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>   xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>   1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> index f0e1edc..bdebc67 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> @@ -1971,6 +1971,8 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_xsave_states(struct domain *d, 
> hvm_domain_context_t *h)
>       struct vcpu *v;
>       struct hvm_hw_cpu_xsave *ctxt;
>       struct hvm_save_descriptor *desc;
> +    u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> +    uint8_t *overflow_start;
>   
>       /* Which vcpu is this? */
>       vcpuid = hvm_load_instance(h);
> @@ -2041,8 +2043,32 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_xsave_states(struct domain *d, 
> hvm_domain_context_t *h)
>           printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
>                  "HVM%d.%d restore mismatch: xsave length %u > %u\n",
>                  d->domain_id, vcpuid, desc->length, size);
This warning should be elided if we pass the zero-check.

> -        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> +        /* Check to see if the xsave_area is the maximum size.
> +           If so, it is likely the save is from an older xen. */
> +        cpuid_count(XSTATE_CPUID, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
This check is bogus for heterogeneous hardware.  We have no way of 
calculating what the maximum xsave area size was on the sending side 
should have been...
> +        if ( desc->length !=
> +             ecx + offsetof(struct hvm_hw_cpu_xsave, save_area) ) {
> +            printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
> +                   "HVM%d.%d restore mismatch: xsave length %u != %u\n",
> +                   d->domain_id, vcpuid, desc->length, ecx +
> +                   (u32)offsetof(struct hvm_hw_cpu_xsave, save_area));
> +            return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +        }
> +
> +        /* Make sure unused bytes are all zero. */
...which is fine, as we literally only care whether the overflow data is 
all zeros of not.
It is is all empty, we really don't care how large it was supposed to be 
before.  If it is not empty, then something is certainly corrupt in this 
record.
> +        overflow_start = (uint8_t *)&ctxt->save_area -
> +                           offsetof(struct hvm_hw_cpu_xsave, save_area);
I am having a hard time working out whether this expression is correct.  
As ctxt is superimposed on top of h->data, would it not make sense to 
check h->data between the expected end, and the real length?  h->data is 
even the correct type for doing this with.
> +        for (int i = size; i < desc->length; i++)
Style

> +        {
> +            if ( *(overflow_start + i) )
> +            {
> +                printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
> +                       "HVM%d.%d restore mismatch: xsave[%d] has non-zero data: 
> %x\n",
> +                       d->domain_id, vcpuid, i, *(overflow_start +i));
I don't think it is useful to print the value of the first non-zero 
byte.  I would reduce it just to "junk found in overflow space".
~Andrew

> +                return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +            }
> +        }
>       }
>       /* Checking finished */
>   

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