Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4] Sanity check xsave area when migrating or restoring from older Xen verions

[Don Koch <dkoch@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Wed, 22 Oct 2014 11:00:52 +0100
Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote:

> >>> On 21.10.14 at 21:25, <dkoch@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Tue, 21 Oct 2014 20:00:53 +0100
> > Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > 
> >> On 21/10/14 19:40, Don Koch wrote:
> >> > Xen 4.3 and older transferred a maximum sized xsave area (as if all
> >> > the available XCR0 bits were set); the new version only transfers
> >> > based on the actual XCR0 bits. This may result in a smaller area if
> >> > the last sections were missing (e.g., the LWP area from an AMD
> >> > machine). If the size doesn't match the XCR0 derived size, the part of
> >> > the xsave area between the XCR0 specified and transferred size is
> >> > checked for zero data. If any part of the overflow area is non-zero,
> >> > we return with an error.
> >> >
> >> > Signed-off-by: Don Koch <dkoch@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> >> > ---
> >> > Changes in V4:
> >> > - Removed check of size base on xfeature_mask.
> >> > - Unsign some ints.
> >> > - Change %d to %u for unsigned ints.
> >> > - Move printk to only print if non-zero data found.
> >> >
> >> > Changes in V3:
> >> > - use h->data for zero check
> >> > - remove max size check (use size that was sent)
> >> > - fix error message (drop first byte value)
> >> > - fix "for" issues
> >> >
> >> > Changes in V2:
> >> > - Add check for size.
> >> > - Add check for non-zero data in unused part of block.
> >> >
> >> >  xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++------------
> >> >  1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> >> >
> >> > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> >> > index f0e1edc..c2780d2 100644
> >> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> >> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> >> > @@ -1971,6 +1971,7 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_xsave_states(struct domain 
> >> > *d, 
> > hvm_domain_context_t *h)
> >> >      struct vcpu *v;
> >> >      struct hvm_hw_cpu_xsave *ctxt;
> >> >      struct hvm_save_descriptor *desc;
> >> > +    unsigned int i, overflow_start;
> >> >  
> >> >      /* Which vcpu is this? */
> >> >      vcpuid = hvm_load_instance(h);
> >> > @@ -2011,15 +2012,8 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_xsave_states(struct 
> >> > domain 
> > *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
> >> >                          save_area) + XSTATE_AREA_MIN_SIZE);
> >> >          return -EINVAL;
> >> >      }
> >> > -    size = HVM_CPU_XSAVE_SIZE(xfeature_mask);
> >> > -    if ( desc->length > size )
> >> > -    {
> >> > -        printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
> >> > -               "HVM%d.%d restore mismatch: xsave length %u > %u\n",
> >> > -               d->domain_id, vcpuid, desc->length, size);
> >> > -        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> >> > -    }
> >> >      h->cur += sizeof (*desc);
> >> > +    overflow_start = h->cur;
> >> >  
> >> >      ctxt = (struct hvm_hw_cpu_xsave *)&h->data[h->cur];
> >> >      h->cur += desc->length;
> >> > @@ -2038,10 +2032,20 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_xsave_states(struct 
> >> > domain 
> > *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h)
> >> >      size = HVM_CPU_XSAVE_SIZE(ctxt->xcr0_accum);
> >> >      if ( desc->length > size )
> >> >      {
> >> > -        printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
> >> > -               "HVM%d.%d restore mismatch: xsave length %u > %u\n",
> >> > -               d->domain_id, vcpuid, desc->length, size);
> >> > -        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> >> > +        /* Make sure missing bytes are all zero. */
> >> 
> >> Please make a reference to the bug in this comment, so the reasons for
> >> the strange check is a little more obvious given a glance at the code.
> >> 
> >> Perhaps
> >> 
> >> /*
> >>  * Xen-4.3 and older used to send longer-than-needed xsave regions. 
> >> Permit loading the record if the extra data is all zero
> >>  */
> >> 
> >> (suitably wrapped, given its natural indentation)
> > 
> > OK, will do.
> > 
> >> > +        for ( i = size; i < desc->length; i++ )
> >> > +        {
> >> > +            if ( h->data[overflow_start + i] )
> >> > +            {
> >> > +                printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
> >> > +                       "HVM%u.%u restore mismatch: xsave length %u > 
> >> > %u\n",
> >> > +                       d->domain_id, vcpuid, desc->length, size);
> >> > +                printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
> >> > +                       "HVM%u.%u restore mismatch: xsave has non-zero 
> >> > data starting at %#x\n",
> >> > +                       d->domain_id, vcpuid, i);
> >> 
> >> This should be one message.  Also note that, while a lot of code gets it
> >> wrong, domain_id is signed while vcpuid is unsigned.
> > 
> > I had suggested one message. Jan said it should be two.
> 
> Right, and I still think it should be two. Just not the way you did it.
> I specifically said in the reply to the previous version " just add your
> new check ahead of the existing printk()". In case this was ambiguous
> to you - I think the pre-existing printk() should continue to get
> issued (even if not being on an error path anymore) so that we have
> some kind of indication that the truncating path was taken. After all
> this shouldn't happen frequently, considering that the most recent
> stable releases of the older branches already don't do this anymore.

I thought that's where I had it. If the block size mismatch is detected,
issue the first message then go into the loop to check for non-zero data
and, if any is found, then issue the second and exit.

Andrew, IIUC, didn't want the first one issued unless the non-zero data
case was found, i.e. issue no message unless both conditions were met.

So, which should I do?

> Jan

Confusedly yours,
-d

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