[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 1/2] x86/mm: Change default value for suppress #VE in set_mem_access()
On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 7:24 PM, Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> I think the issue would be whether to allow a domain to set/clear the >> suppress #VE bit for its pages by calling the new HVMOP on itself. > > This problem is not limited to setting the SVE bit. It also applies to > swapping altp2m views. Pretty much all altp2m HVMOPs can be issued > from a user-space program without any way to check whether that > process is allowed to do that or not. If you don't think it is safe > for a domain to set SVE, the none of the altp2m ops are safe for the > domain to issue on itself. If we could say ensure only the kernel can > issue the hvmops, that would be OK. But that's not possible at the > moment AFAICT. Wait, is that right? I think we normally restrict hypercalls to only being made from the guest kernel, don't we? -George _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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