[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v11 2/5] xen/riscv: introduce decode_cause() stuff
On Thu, 2024-08-01 at 13:44 +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 24.07.2024 17:31, Oleksii Kurochko wrote: > > The patch introduces stuff needed to decode a reason of an > > exception. > > > > Signed-off-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx> > > Acked-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xxxxxxx> > > Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> > > --- > > Changes in V11: > > - Nothing changed. Only rebase. > > --- > > Changes in V10: > > - add Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> > > --- > > Changes in V9: > > - This patch was reverted as breaks both release and randconfig > > builds. > > I don't see the failures now. ( probably it was because of > > printk usage > > which was not ready at that moment ). > > - drop inclusion of <asm/csr.h> and <asm/early_printk.h> > > - add <asm/riscv_encoding.h> for CAUSE_* in decode_trap_cause(). > > --- > > Changes in V8: > > - fix typo in return string from decode_reserved_interrupt_cause > > - add Acked-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xxxxxxx> > > --- > > Changes in V7: > > - Nothing changed. Only rebase. > > --- > > Changes in V6: > > - Remove usage of LINK_TO_LOAD() due to the MMU being enabled > > first. > > - Change early_printk() to printk() > > --- > > Changes in V5: > > - Remove <xen/error.h> from riscv/traps/c as nothing would > > require > > inclusion. > > - decode_reserved_interrupt_cause(), decode_interrupt_cause(), > > decode_cause, do_unexpected_trap() > > were made as static they are expected to be used only in > > traps.c > > - use LINK_TO_LOAD() for addresses which can be linker time > > relative. > > --- > > Changes in V4: > > - fix string in decode_reserved_interrupt_cause() > > --- > > Changes in V3: > > - Nothing changed > > --- > > Changes in V2: > > - Make decode_trap_cause() more optimization friendly. > > - Merge the pathc which introduces do_unexpected_trap() to the > > current one. > > --- > > xen/arch/riscv/traps.c | 80 > > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > > 1 file changed, 79 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/xen/arch/riscv/traps.c b/xen/arch/riscv/traps.c > > index 5415cf8d90..37cec40dfa 100644 > > --- a/xen/arch/riscv/traps.c > > +++ b/xen/arch/riscv/traps.c > > @@ -9,13 +9,91 @@ > > #include <xen/sched.h> > > > > #include <asm/processor.h> > > +#include <asm/riscv_encoding.h> > > #include <asm/traps.h> > > > > -void do_trap(struct cpu_user_regs *cpu_regs) > > +static const char *decode_trap_cause(unsigned long cause) > > +{ > > + static const char *const trap_causes[] = { > > + [CAUSE_MISALIGNED_FETCH] = "Instruction Address > > Misaligned", > > + [CAUSE_FETCH_ACCESS] = "Instruction Access Fault", > > + [CAUSE_ILLEGAL_INSTRUCTION] = "Illegal Instruction", > > + [CAUSE_BREAKPOINT] = "Breakpoint", > > + [CAUSE_MISALIGNED_LOAD] = "Load Address Misaligned", > > + [CAUSE_LOAD_ACCESS] = "Load Access Fault", > > + [CAUSE_MISALIGNED_STORE] = "Store/AMO Address Misaligned", > > + [CAUSE_STORE_ACCESS] = "Store/AMO Access Fault", > > + [CAUSE_USER_ECALL] = "Environment Call from U-Mode", > > + [CAUSE_SUPERVISOR_ECALL] = "Environment Call from S-Mode", > > + [CAUSE_MACHINE_ECALL] = "Environment Call from M-Mode", > > + [CAUSE_FETCH_PAGE_FAULT] = "Instruction Page Fault", > > + [CAUSE_LOAD_PAGE_FAULT] = "Load Page Fault", > > + [CAUSE_STORE_PAGE_FAULT] = "Store/AMO Page Fault", > > + [CAUSE_FETCH_GUEST_PAGE_FAULT] = "Instruction Guest Page > > Fault", > > + [CAUSE_LOAD_GUEST_PAGE_FAULT] = "Load Guest Page Fault", > > + [CAUSE_VIRTUAL_INST_FAULT] = "Virtualized Instruction > > Fault", > > + [CAUSE_STORE_GUEST_PAGE_FAULT] = "Guest Store/AMO Page > > Fault", > > + }; > > + > > + if ( cause < ARRAY_SIZE(trap_causes) && trap_causes[cause] ) > > + return trap_causes[cause]; > > + return "UNKNOWN"; > > +} > > While I committed this as-is, two more points: First, as soon any any > such array access becomes potentially reachable because of guest > activity, it wants to use array_access_nospec() or alike. Could you please explain why ( specifically ) guest activity affects if array access becomes potentially reachable? > Second, and > somewhat related, it may be desirable to avoid such double accesses. > Hopefully the compiler will do that for you. But > > const char *res = cause < ARRAY_SIZE(trap_causes) ? > trap_causes[cause] > : NULL; > > return res ?: "UNKNOWN"; > > might be worthwhile anyway. Thanks. I will apply this suggestion in the next version of this patch series. ~ Oleksii
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |