[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: PCI devices passthrough on Arm design proposal

  • To: Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>
  • From: Bertrand Marquis <Bertrand.Marquis@xxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2020 14:47:45 +0000
  • Accept-language: en-GB, en-US
  • Arc-authentication-results: i=1; mx.microsoft.com 1; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=arm.com; dmarc=pass action=none header.from=arm.com; dkim=pass header.d=arm.com; arc=none
  • Arc-message-signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=microsoft.com; s=arcselector9901; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck; bh=xT/wGwwoOzWVt+0lVfy7eq7m1fOUmHHNnveMSLal9Ak=; b=W7tQSu1LE2d5NXPwYFBrxW2Cd+Fw43wSIFFRGp7gb5G8LF7V1oI5WgDKqb8V4Z7Bsz5Xs6afwR6W+WW2vPRc0HqM+wNdYWaXkGMnsYtIujG9Wx/aM+k1ZzJmV4uf2WtjvqJGOMV4+IZ2PwwLLk97F1ZiUh7JIM1rB7Uh2LWaFzXA29sF1d0r4yfvRDESV2NPsrXpiM53qPZpcrK48UBG7nOIqcsf0cjLzHDzHMcIs73CpfYL9x/N+0QfcK6vdeLLGBfDMiMPRffkyqrChI8UGDT6kdBWZJ1IxYER5EeXldm+P6SbmDp2UZuQ9XPRMA8xMwJbI+KElHCcxWW/wR/1XQ==
  • Arc-seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; s=arcselector9901; d=microsoft.com; cv=none; b=iNYSPn6jnIiajt6EPIwYs9mbSE5Cgj3WhuOz8o2GQT2Gf5PD958nXQLsBuvDBihjZ/vZfralqyV8X3QV6Go0pQtguw07rMr2MkoJbErs9vgrqGVAoKwjayAa0hwSHC7lRJ08ZDRL7CRcNS4zzV9e7NFy5SbcOvMIEjrLTEP+PxY0tyBeHBvYHJwI00aIUJ4sIv4aHKRwgKzkOSx6gJVbIb9iVr75QhOMGeWyJbdhMfYGDMsMikfJqCSApj+wh8YlU6WE0DfHEYl3YitpQEWZxekBh6Os3T/Mu1/HAfuUuNRCV2OLPANw7kQ42SS7OIzIrw9SikJjStEwdlFImxfgJg==
  • Authentication-results-original: xen.org; dkim=none (message not signed) header.d=none;xen.org; dmarc=none action=none header.from=arm.com;
  • Cc: Rahul Singh <Rahul.Singh@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, nd <nd@xxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien.grall.oss@xxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Fri, 17 Jul 2020 14:48:06 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
  • Nodisclaimer: true
  • Original-authentication-results: xen.org; dkim=none (message not signed) header.d=none;xen.org; dmarc=none action=none header.from=arm.com;
  • Thread-index: AQHWW4kYTVU0hTDyYEitKlUuU5vZlKkLzBPIgAAPUAA=
  • Thread-topic: PCI devices passthrough on Arm design proposal

> On 17 Jul 2020, at 15:50, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> (Resending to the correct ML)
> On 17/07/2020 14:23, Julien Grall wrote:
>> On 16/07/2020 18:02, Rahul Singh wrote:
>>> Hello All,
>> Hi,
>>> Following up on discussion on PCI Passthrough support on ARM that we had at 
>>> the XEN summit, we are submitting a Review For Comment and a design 
>>> proposal for PCI passthrough support on ARM. Feel free to give your 
>>> feedback.
>>> The followings describe the high-level design proposal of the PCI 
>>> passthrough support and how the different modules within the system 
>>> interacts with each other to assign a particular PCI device to the guest.
>> There was an attempt a few years ago to get a design document for PCI 
>> passthrough (see [1]). I would suggest to have a look at the thread as I 
>> think it would help to have an overview of all the components (e.g MSI 
>> controllers...) even if they will not be implemented at the beginning.

Thanks for the pointer. This design is a first draft that we will improve and 
complete it along the way.

>>> # Title:
>>> PCI devices passthrough on Arm design proposal
>>> # Problem statement:
>>> On ARM there in no support to assign a PCI device to a guest. PCI device 
>>> passthrough capability allows guests to have full access to some PCI 
>>> devices. PCI device passthrough allows PCI devices to appear and behave as 
>>> if they were physically attached to the guest operating system and provide 
>>> full isolation of the PCI devices.
>>> Goal of this work is to also support Dom0Less configuration so the PCI 
>>> backend/frontend drivers used on x86 shall not be used on Arm. It will use 
>>> the existing VPCI concept from X86 and implement the virtual PCI bus 
>>> through IO emulation​ such that only assigned devices are visible​ to the 
>>> guest and guest can use the standard PCI driver.
>>> Only Dom0 and Xen will have access to the real PCI bus,​ guest will have a 
>>> direct access to the assigned device itself​. IOMEM memory will be mapped 
>>> to the guest ​and interrupt will be redirected to the guest. SMMU has to be 
>>> configured correctly to have DMA transaction.
>>> ## Current state: Draft version
>>> # Proposer(s): Rahul Singh, Bertrand Marquis
>>> # Proposal:
>>> This section will describe the different subsystem to support the PCI 
>>> device passthrough and how these subsystems interact with each other to 
>>> assign a device to the guest.
>>> # PCI Terminology:
>>> Host Bridge: Host bridge allows the PCI devices to talk to the rest of the 
>>> computer.
>>> ECAM: ECAM (Enhanced Configuration Access Mechanism) is a mechanism 
>>> developed to allow PCIe to access configuration space. The space available 
>>> per function is 4KB.
>>> # Discovering PCI Host Bridge in XEN:
>>> In order to support the PCI passthrough XEN should be aware of all the PCI 
>>> host bridges available on the system and should be able to access the PCI 
>>> configuration space. ECAM configuration access is supported as of now. XEN 
>>> during boot will read the PCI device tree node “reg” property and will map 
>>> the ECAM space to the XEN memory using the “ioremap_nocache ()” function.
>>> If there are more than one segment on the system, XEN will read the “linux, 
>>> pci-domain” property from the device tree node and configure  the host 
>>> bridge segment number accordingly. All the PCI device tree nodes should 
>>> have the “linux,pci-domain” property so that there will be no conflicts. 
>>> During hardware domain boot Linux will also use the same “linux,pci-domain” 
>>> property and assign the domain number to the host bridge.
>> AFAICT, "linux,pci-domain" is not a mandatory option and mostly tie to 
>> Linux. What would happen with other OS?
>> But I would rather avoid trying to mandate a user to modifying his/her 
>> device-tree in order to support PCI passthrough. It would be better to 
>> consider Xen to assign the number if it is not present.

so you would suggest here that if this entry is not present in the 
configuration, we just assign a value inside xen ? How should this information 
be passed to the guest ? 
This number is required for the current hypercall to declare devices to xen so 
those could end up being different.

>>> When Dom0 tries to access the PCI config space of the device, XEN will find 
>>> the corresponding host bridge based on segment number and access the 
>>> corresponding config space assigned to that bridge.
>>> Limitation:
>>> * Only PCI ECAM configuration space access is supported.
>>> * Device tree binding is supported as of now, ACPI is not supported.
>> We want to differentiate the high-level design from the actual 
>> implementation. While you may not yet implement ACPI, we still need to keep 
>> it in mind to avoid incompatibilities in long term.

For sure we do not want to make anything which would not be possible to 
implement with ACPI. 
I hope the community will help us during review to find those possible problems 
if we do not see them. 

>>> * Need to port the PCI host bridge access code to XEN to access the 
>>> configuration space (generic one works but lots of platforms will required  
>>> some specific code or quirks).
>>> # Discovering PCI devices:
>>> PCI-PCIe enumeration is a process of detecting devices connected to its 
>>> host. It is the responsibility of the hardware domain or boot firmware to 
>>> do the PCI enumeration and configure the BAR, PCI capabilities, and 
>>> MSI/MSI-X configuration.
>>> PCI-PCIe enumeration in XEN is not feasible for the configuration part as 
>>> it would require a lot of code inside Xen which would require a lot of 
>>> maintenance. Added to this many platforms require some quirks in that part 
>>> of the PCI code which would greatly improve Xen complexity. Once hardware 
>>> domain enumerates the device then it will communicate to XEN via the below 
>>> hypercall.
>>> #define PHYSDEVOP_pci_device_add        25
>>> struct physdev_pci_device_add {
>>>      uint16_t seg;
>>>      uint8_t bus;
>>>      uint8_t devfn;
>>>      uint32_t flags;
>>>      struct {
>>>          uint8_t bus;
>>>          uint8_t devfn;
>>>      } physfn;
>>>      /*
>>>      * Optional parameters array.
>>>      * First element ([0]) is PXM domain associated with the device (if * 
>>> XEN_PCI_DEV_PXM is set)
>>>      */
>>>      uint32_t optarr[XEN_FLEX_ARRAY_DIM];
>>>      };
>>> As the hypercall argument has the PCI segment number, XEN will access the 
>>> PCI config space based on this segment number and find the host-bridge 
>>> corresponding to this segment number. At this stage host bridge is fully 
>>> initialized so there will be no issue to access the config space.
>>> XEN will add the PCI devices in the linked list maintain in XEN using the 
>>> function pci_add_device(). XEN will be aware of all the PCI devices on the 
>>> system and all the device will be added to the hardware domain.
>> I understand this what x86 does. However, may I ask why we would want it for 
>> Arm?

We wanted to be as near as possible from x86 implementation and design. 
But if you have an other idea here we are fully open to discuss it. 

>>> Limitations:
>>> * When PCI devices are added to XEN, MSI capability is not initialized 
>>> inside XEN and not supported as of now.
>>> * ACS capability is disable for ARM as of now as after enabling it devices 
>>> are not accessible.
>> I am not sure to understand this. Can you expand?

As a temporary workaround we turned that feature off in the code for now but we 
will fix that later.

>>> * Dom0Less implementation will require to have the capacity inside Xen to 
>>> discover the PCI devices (without depending on Dom0 to declare them to Xen).
>>> # Enable the existing x86 virtual PCI support for ARM:
>>> The existing VPCI support available for X86 is adapted for Arm. When the 
>>> device is added to XEN via the hyper call “PHYSDEVOP_pci_device_add”, VPCI 
>>> handler for the config space access is added to the PCI device to emulate 
>>> the PCI devices.
>>> A MMIO trap handler for the PCI ECAM space is registered in XEN so that 
>>> when guest is trying to access the PCI config space, XEN will trap the 
>>> access and emulate read/write using the VPCI and not the real PCI hardware.
>>> Limitation:
>>> * No handler is register for the MSI configuration.
>>> * Only legacy interrupt is supported and tested as of now, MSI is not 
>>> implemented and tested.
>> IIRC, legacy interrupt may be shared between two PCI devices. How do you 
>> plan to handle this on Arm?

We plan to fix this by adding proper support for MSI in the long term. 
For the use case where MSI is not supported or not wanted we might have to find 
a way to forward the hardware interrupt to several guests to emulate some kind 
of shared interrupt.

>>> # Assign the device to the guest:
>>> Assign the PCI device from the hardware domain to the guest is done using 
>>> the below guest config option. When xl tool create the domain, PCI devices 
>>> will be assigned to the guest VPCI bus.
>> Above, you suggest that device will be assigned to the hardware domain at 
>> boot. I am assuming this also means that all the interrupts/MMIOs will be 
>> routed/mapped, is that correct?
>> If so, can you provide a rough sketch how assign/deassign will work?

Yes this is correct. We will improve the design and add a more detailed 
description on that in the next version. 
To make it short we remove the resources from the hardware domain first and 
assign them to the guest the device has been assigned to. There are still some 
parts in there where we are still in investigation mode on that part. 

>>>     pci=[ "PCI_SPEC_STRING", "PCI_SPEC_STRING", ...]
>>> Guest will be only able to access the assigned devices and see the bridges. 
>>> Guest will not be able to access or see the devices that are no assigned to 
>>> him.
>>> Limitation:
>>> * As of now all the bridges in the PCI bus are seen by the guest on the 
>>> VPCI bus.
>> Why do you want to expose all the bridges to a guest? Does this mean that 
>> the BDF should always match between the host and the guest?

That’s not really something that we wanted but this was the easiest way to go.
As said in a previous mail we could build a VPCI bus with a completely 
different topology but I am not sure of the advantages this would have.
Do you see some reason to do this ?

>>> # Emulated PCI device tree node in libxl:
>>> Libxl is creating a virtual PCI device tree node in the device tree to 
>>> enable the guest OS to discover the virtual PCI during guest boot. We 
>>> introduced the new config option [vpci="pci_ecam"] for guests. When this 
>>> config option is enabled in a guest configuration, a PCI device tree node 
>>> will be created in the guest device tree.
>>> A new area has been reserved in the arm guest physical map at which the 
>>> VPCI bus is declared in the device tree (reg and ranges parameters of the 
>>> node). A trap handler for the PCI ECAM access from guest has been 
>>> registered at the defined address and redirects requests to the VPCI driver 
>>> in Xen.
>>> Limitation:
>>> * Only one PCI device tree node is supported as of now.
>>> BAR value and IOMEM mapping:
>>> Linux guest will do the PCI enumeration based on the area reserved for ECAM 
>>> and IOMEM ranges in the VPCI device tree node. Once PCI    device is 
>>> assigned to the guest, XEN will map the guest PCI IOMEM region to the real 
>>> physical IOMEM region only for the assigned devices.
>>> As of now we have not modified the existing VPCI code to map the guest PCI 
>>> IOMEM region to the real physical IOMEM region. We used the existing guest 
>>> “iomem” config option to map the region.
>>> For example:
>>>     Guest reserved IOMEM region:  0x04020000
>>>          Real physical IOMEM region:0x50000000
>>>          IOMEM size:128MB
>>>          iomem config will be:   iomem = ["0x50000,0x8000@0x4020"]
>>> There is no need to map the ECAM space as XEN already have access to the 
>>> ECAM space and XEN will trap ECAM accesses from the guest and will perform 
>>> read/write on the VPCI bus.
>>> IOMEM access will not be trapped and the guest will directly access the 
>>> IOMEM region of the assigned device via stage-2 translation.
>>> In the same, we mapped the assigned devices IRQ to the guest using below 
>>> config options.
>>>     irqs= [ NUMBER, NUMBER, ...]
>>> Limitation:
>>> * Need to avoid the “iomem” and “irq” guest config options and map the 
>>> IOMEM region and IRQ at the same time when device is assigned to the guest 
>>> using the “pci” guest config options when xl creates the domain.
>>> * Emulated BAR values on the VPCI bus should reflect the IOMEM mapped 
>>> address.
>>> * X86 mapping code should be ported on Arm so that the stage-2 translation 
>>> is adapted when the guest is doing a modification of the BAR registers 
>>> values (to map the address requested by the guest for a specific IOMEM to 
>>> the address actually contained in the real BAR register of the 
>>> corresponding device).
>>> # SMMU configuration for guest:
>>> When assigning PCI devices to a guest, the SMMU configuration should be 
>>> updated to remove access to the hardware domain memory and add
>>> configuration to have access to the guest memory with the proper address 
>>> translation so that the device can do DMA operations from and to the guest 
>>> memory only.
>> There are a few more questions to answer here:
>>    - When a guest is destroyed, who will be the owner of the PCI devices? 
>> Depending on the answer, how do you make sure the device is quiescent?

I would say the hardware domain if there is one otherwise nobody. 
On the quiescent part this is definitely something for which I have no answer 
for now and any suggestion is more then welcome.

>>    - Is there any memory access that can bypassed the IOMMU (e.g doorbell)?

This is still something to be investigated as part of the MSI implementation. 
If you have any idea here, feel free to tell us. 

We are submitting all this as requested during Xen Summit to have some first 
feedback but this is a huge work package and there are still lots of areas that 
we have to dig into :-)


>> Cheers,
>> [1] 
>> https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-05/msg02520.html
> -- 
> Julien Grall



Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.