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[PATCH 00/12] x86: more or less log-dirty related improvements

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  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 25 Jun 2021 15:15:29 +0200
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... or so I hope. This series continues the attempt to deal with
the ovmf change putting the shared info page at a very high address
(which is now planned to get reverted there, but the general
problem doesn't go away by them doing so). There are further issues
with truncated value, which are being dealt with here. But there
are also not directly related changes, when I simply spotted things
that aren't very likely to be right the way they are. And then
there are also adjustments to the underlying hypervisor
implementation, with the goal of making the returned data more
useful to the consumers.

With these changes in place, a 1Gb guest which has "inflated"
itself by putting a page right below the 16Tb boundary migrates
successfully, albeit the process takes from some 20 minutes to over
half an hour on my test system.

01: libxc: split xc_logdirty_control() from xc_shadow_control()
02: libxenguest: deal with log-dirty op stats overflow
03: libxenguest: short-circuit "all-dirty" handling
04: libxenguest: avoid allocating unused deferred-pages bitmap
05: libxenguest: complete loops in xc_map_domain_meminfo()
06: libxenguest: guard against overflow from too large p2m when checkpointing
07: libxenguest: fix off-by-1 in colo-secondary-bitmap merging
08: x86/paging: deal with log-dirty stats overflow
09: x86/paging: supply more useful log-dirty page count
10: x86/mm: update log-dirty bitmap when manipulating P2M
11: x86/mm: pull a sanity check earlier in xenmem_add_to_physmap_one()
12: SUPPORT.md: write down restriction of 32-bit tool stacks




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